





Volume 31, Issue 3 
  





Noritaka Kudoh  
Hokkaido University 
Hong Thang Nguyen  
Hokkaido University
Abstract 
We explore the long-run implications of adopting a Taylor-type interest-rate rule in a simple monetary growth model in 
which budget deficits are financed partly by unbacked government debt. Because monetary policy is accommodative 
only when it is passive, the Taylor principle, which requires monetary policy to be active, itself generates a negative 
relationship between output and inflation. As a result, a permanent increase in government consumption becomes 
contractionary. Thus, policy makers face a choice between implementing an activist fiscal policy and following the 
Taylor principle.
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1. Introduction
Since the publication of Taylor (1993), many researchers have integrated a Taylor-type
interest-rate rule into a variety of dynamic general equilibrium monetary models to verify or
challenge the so-called Taylor principle, according to which, for stability, the central bank
must be “active”, which means that it raises (cuts) the nominal interest rate by more than
one percent if the inﬂation rate increases (decreases) by one percent.
To date, one of the major criteria for evaluating a policy rule is whether the policy guar-
antees uniqueness of rational expectations equilibrium or introduces self-fulﬁlling sunspot
ﬂuctuations. Thus, the Taylor principle is often tested on the ground of uniqueness of steady-
state equilibrium or determinacy of the steady-state equilibrium (Leeper, 1991; Benhabib et
al., 2001a, 2001b; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001).
Since the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007 and the recession that followed, there has been a
resurgence of interest, among economists and policy-makers, in the eﬀects of debt-ﬁnanced
government spending. Motivated by this observation, we study whether the Taylor principle
must be satisﬁed in the times of ﬁscal expansion. In particular, we study the eﬀects of
debt-ﬁnanced ﬁscal policy when the central bank follows a Taylor-type interest-rate rule.
To do so, it is important to start with a model in which public debt is not neutral.
Schabert (2004) studied a New Keynesian model in which public debt provides transaction
services, and found that monetary policy should not be too aggressive, or the eﬀect of
ﬁscal spending will be reduced. Ascari and Rankin (2010) studied a New Keynesian model
with ﬁnitely-lived agents that is similar to Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), and argued that
a permanent increase in public debt decreases steady-state output. Using the basic New
Keynesian model, Woodford (2011) summarized how the government spending multiplier
depends on the monetary policy response.
In this paper, we build and study a ﬂexible-price overlapping generations model with
money, public debt, and capital accumulation that is similar to Schreft and Smith (1997,
1998) and Bhattacharya et al. (1997). Our study is closely related to Schabert (2004),
Ascari and Rankin (2010), and Woodford (2011), but we obtain some new results because
in our neoclassical growth model, monetary policy has real eﬀects through investment. The
key feature of our model is that, in any steady-state equilibrium, inﬂation promotes capital
accumulation if and only if monetary policy is passive. In other words, the Taylor principle
itself generates a negative relationship between output and inﬂation. As a result, under an
active monetary policy, an increase in government spending translates into a higher nominal
interest rate and lower capital and output.
The main results are as follows. First, for uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium,
monetary policy cannot be either too active or too passive, because multiple steady-state
equilibria can arise in either case. In other words, the elasticity of the nominal interest rate
with respect to a change in inﬂation must be close to one to guarantee uniqueness. Second,
although ﬁscal policy increases output under a passive monetary policy, the output eﬀect
becomes negligible as the elasticity gets closer to one (to ensure uniqueness of steady state).
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2. The Model
Consider an economy consisting of an inﬁnite sequence of two-period-lived overlapping
generations, an initial old generation, and an inﬁnitely-lived government.1 Let t =1 ,2,...
index time. At each date t, a new generation of a unit measure is born. Each agent is
endowed with one unit of labor when young and is retired when old. In addition, the initial
old agents are endowed with K1 > 0 units of capital and M0 > 0 units of ﬁat money.




t with A ≥ 1 and 0 < α < 1/2,w h e r eKt denotes the capital input and Nt
denotes the labor input. Let kt ≡ Kt/Nt denote the capital-labor ratio. Then, the intensive
production function is f(kt)=Akα
t . It is easy to see that f(0) = 0, f0 > 0 >f 00,a n dt h e
Inada conditions hold. The ﬁnal good can either be consumed in the period it is produced,
or stored to yield capital in the next period. For expositional reasons, capital is assumed to
depreciate 100% between periods.
Factor markets are perfectly competitive. Thus, factors of production receive their mar-
ginal product. Let rt and wt denote the rental rate of capital and the real wage rate. Each
young agent supplies his or her labor endowment inelastically in the labor market. Then,
proﬁt maximization requires rt = f0(kt) and wt = f(kt) − ktf0(kt) ≡ w(kt). For the Cobb-
Douglas speciﬁcation, rt = αAk
α−1
t and w(kt)=( 1− α)Akα
t .
In order to focus on agents’ portfolio choice, we follow Schreft and Smith (1997, 1998)
and Bhattacharya et al. (1997) to assume that all individuals save all their income. As a
means of saving, agents may hold money and non-monetary assets. In order to motivate
the demand for money as a liquid asset, we divide each period into two subperiods. The
non-monetary assets, denoted by Zt, are assumed to yield a gross nominal return of It+1 ≥ 1
in the next period. However, the non-monetary assets cannot be liquidated until the second
subperiod. Money, whose nominal interest rate is zero, is assumed to be the only liquid
asset in this economy. Thus, the only distinction between money and non-monetary assets
is that non-monetary assets must be held a little longer (Kudoh, 2007).
We assume that each individual wishes to consume in both subperiods. Let c1t and c2t
denote the consumption of the ﬁnal good in the ﬁrst and second subperiods, respectively, by
an old agent born in period t. The individual’s objective function is φu(c1t)+(1− φ)u(c2t),
where φ captures the relative weight of utility between the two subperiods. Throughout,
we use the following speciﬁcation: u(c)=[ 1− ρ]−1c1−ρ with ρ 6=1and ρ > 0. Because
the individual cannot liquidate non-monetary assets in the ﬁr s ts u b p e r i o d ,t h ea g e n tf a c e sa
cash-in-advance constraint: pt+1c1t ≤ Mt. The individual’s budget constraint when young is
Mt +Zt = ptwt −Tt, where the consumer takes Tt as given. Similarly, the budget constraint
when old is pt+1c1t +pt+1c2t = Mt +It+1Zt. The cash-in-advance constraint binds as long as
the (net) nominal interest rate is positive (i.e., It > 1). Under the binding cash-in-advance
constraint, we obtain pt+1c2t = It+1Zt = It+1[ptwt − Tt − Mt]. Thus, a young individual’s
1The detail of the model is presented in the working paper version of the paper (Kudoh and Nguyen,
2010). See also Schreft and Smith (1997, 1998) and Bhattacharya et al. (1997).
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The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem yields the following money demand function:















It is easy to establish that γ0(I) < 0 holds for ρ ∈ (0,1), limI→∞ γ(I)=0and limI→0 γ(I)=1
hold for ρ ∈ (0,1),a n dγ(1) = [1 + ((1 − φ)/φ)1/ρ]−1. Throughout, we focus on the case in
which ρ ∈ (0,1) so that the money demand function possesses the standard property that
γ0(I) < 0.
We let Gt denote the government spending, Tt denote the amount of tax revenue, It ≥ 1
denote the gross nominal interest rate, and B
g
t denote the amount of government bonds




t for t ≥ 2
and G1 = T1 +B
g
1 for t =1 . We assume that the government simply consumes Gt and that
Gt does not aﬀect the utility of any generation or the production process at any date. It
follows that









t/pt,a n dRt+1 ≡ It+1pt/pt+1. Because bonds and
capital are competing ﬁnancial assets in this economy, the non-arbitrage condition requires
the rates of return on these assets to be the same in equilibrium. Thus, Rt = f0(kt).
If Bm
t denotes the monetary authority’s demand for government bonds, then the budget
constraint for the central bank is Bm
t = ItBm
t−1 + Mt − Mt−1 for t ≥ 1,w h e r eBm
t is the















t /pt and mt = Mt/pt. In what follows, we let Πt ≡ pt/pt−1.
In this paper, we consider the following policy rules. The ﬁscal authority chooses the
entire path for the real government spending. To simplify the analysis, we assume gt = g
for all t. We assume that the tax is set to be proportional to the real wage rate: τt = θwt,
where 0 ≤ θ < 1 is an exogenous tax rate.
Following Leeper (1991) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), we assume that the central
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for β > 0,a n dI∗ for β =0 ,w h e r eI∗ and Π∗ are the implicit targets for It and Πt.2 We
choose these targets to be consistent with the natural real interest rate, which is the growth
rate of the economy. Thus, I∗/Π∗ ≡ R∗ =1in this economy. The level of β is of paramount
importance in the analysis. Linearizing (6) yields (Π/I)dI/dΠ = β.T h u s ,β is the elasticity
that captures the degree of aggressiveness of monetary policy.
3. Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions for the asset markets are as follows. First, dividing (2) by pt
yields
mt =( 1− θ)γ(It+1)w(kt), (7)
which turns out to be the market clearing condition for money. The capital market equilib-
rium requires Zt = Bt + ptKt+1. Dividing it by pt yields
bt + kt+1 =( 1− θ)[1− γ(It+1)]w(kt). (8)
The bond market equilibrium requires Bt +Bm
t = B
g
t,w h e r eBt i st h eb o n dh o l d i n g sb yt h e






We substitute the government budget constraint (4) and the central bank’s budget constraint
(5) into (9) to obtain the consolidated government budget constraint:




Throughout the paper, we focus on the steady-state equilibria, in which all real variables
are invariant over time. It is easy to show that the monetary policy rule (6), the Fisher









1−β ≡ i(k), (11)
which summarizes the equilibrium relationship between the nominal interest rate and capital
under various degrees of monetary policy activeness.
Similarly, we substitute the market clearing conditions for money (7) and capital (8) into
the consolidated government budget constraint (10) to obtain
μ(I)=
[Akα − k − g]k1−2α
α(1 − α)(1 − θ)A2 ≡ η(k), (12)
2The expression (6) does not have a term that relates the output gap to the nominal interest rate. It
is important to note that in our ﬂexible-price economy, the output gap is, by construction, zero (see, e.g.,
Woodford, 2003). Further, according to the estimates of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998), the coeﬃcient
on the output gap is quite small for many central banks.
4
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where μ(I) ≡ 1−γ(I)+γ(I)/I. Thus, a steady state equilibrium is determined by a solution
to the system of equations (11) and (12). It follows from the properties of the function γ(I)
that μ(1) = 1,a n df o rρ ∈ (0,1), limI→0 μ(I)=∞ and limI→∞ μ(I)=1 . This suggests that
the function μ(·) is generally U-shaped. However, because I is the (gross) nominal interest
rate, the value of I we study can be limited to a range that is close to one. In addition, we
exclude the scenario of a negative nominal interest rate (I<1) from our analysis. Finally,
it is easy to establish that μ0(I) < 0 holds for I ∈ [1,1/(1−ρ)],w h i c hi d e n t i ﬁes the region of
I in which the function μ(·) is monotonic and therefore invertible. Throughout this paper,
we limit our attention to the region I ∈ [1,1/(1 − ρ)]. It follows from the expression (12)
that
I = μ
−1 (η(k)) ≡ Ω(k). (13)
It is now evident that the steady-state equilibria are completely characterized diagram-
matically by the intersections of the two loci deﬁned by (11) and (13). To proceed, we need
to study the shapes of the two loci.












from which it is easy to establish that the i(k)-locus is downward sloping under an active
monetary policy (β > 1) and is upward sloping under a passive monetary policy (β < 1). To
summarize, the nominal interest rate and output are negatively related if and only if mone-
tary policy is active. The intuition is as follows. Under an active monetary policy, the central
bank reacts strongly to a change in the inﬂation rate, implying that the nominal interest
rate changes more than the inﬂation rate. Thus, the Fisher equation (R = I/Π) implies
that the nominal interest rate and the real interest rate are positively related. Therefore,
the nominal interest rate and the stock of capital are negatively related along the i(k)-locus
under an active monetary policy. Because the nominal interest rate changes less than the
inﬂation rate under a passive monetary policy, the nominal interest rate and the stock of
capital are positively related along the i(k)-locus.
We now proceed to studying the conﬁguration of the Ω(k)- l o c u s .T od os ow eﬁrst need
to study the properties of the function η(k).I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a t ,b e c a u s eα < 1/2,t h e
equation η(k)=0has three roots: k =0and the roots of Akα −k −g =0 . In addition, we
note that η(0) = 0 and limk→ η(k)=−∞. From the deﬁnition of η(k),i ti se a s yt oo b t a i n
η
0(k)=
Akα − 2k − 1−2α
1−α g
α(1 − θ)A2k2α . (14)
It is easy to verify that limk→0 η0(k)=−∞ and limk→∞ η0(k)=−∞.L e tk
0 and ¯ k0 (k
0 < ¯ k0)
denote the two distinct solutions to the numerator of (14). Then, η0(k) > 0 holds for
k ∈ (k
0,¯ k0). Since we limit our attention to I ∈ [1,1/(1 − ρ)], this will limit the region of k
as well. I ∈ [1,1/(1 − ρ)] implies that μ(I) ∈ [μ(1/(1 − ρ)),μ(1)].L e tk and ¯ k denote the
two distinct solutions to μ(1/(1−ρ)) = η(k).I ti st h e ne a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tη(k) > 0 for any
k ∈ [k,¯ k]. Further, it is evident that an increase in g shifts the η(k)-locus downward.
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Figure 1.
Figure 2.
We now study the Ω(k)-locus. It is easy to verify that Ω0(k)=η0(k)/μ0(I) and Ω00(k)=
η00(k)/μ0(I).T h u s , t h e c o n ﬁguration of Ω(k) can be deduced from that of η(k). Noticing
μ0(I) < 0 for I ∈ [1,1/(1 − ρ)], it is straightforward to obtain the conﬁguration of Ω(k),
6
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which is depicted in Figure 2. It is easy to verify that an increase in g shifts the locus
upward. It is important to note that part of the Ω(k)-locus can be below I =1 . However,
we can safely exclude such a scenario by considering the case where g is suﬃciently high.
Having established the conﬁgurations of the two loci, (11) and (13), we are now in the
position to ﬁnd the steady-state equilibria.












If k∗ satisﬁes k∗ <kor ¯ k<k ∗, then there are at most two steady state equilibria.
We construct a proof of proposition 1 in what follows using diagrams. Since we limit
our analysis to I ∈ [1,1/(1 − ρ)],w ed e ﬁne ˜ k and k∗ to be the solutions to i(k)=1and
i(k)=1 /(1 − ρ), respectively. In particular, ˜ k ≡ (αAΠ∗/I∗1/β)1/(1−α). Figure 2 depicts a
case in which k∗ satisﬁes k <k ∗ < ¯ k. Since the function i(k) is monotonic for any β ≥ 0,i t
is evident from the ﬁgure that the steady state is uniquely determined.
To present sharp results, in what follows we preclude the polar scenarios in which mon-
etary policy is too active and too passive, to focus on the case of a unique steady state
equilibrium. In this case, |i0(k)| > |Ω0(k)| holds at the steady state (Figure 3). From (11)







where ∂η(k)/∂g<0 and μ0(I) < 0. It follows that dk/dg > 0 if and only if i0(k) > Ω0(k).
Proposition 2 Suppose k∗ satisﬁes k <k ∗ < ¯ k. If monetary policy is active, then an
increase in g reduces k and increases I and Π. If monetary policy is passive, then it increases
k, I,a n dΠ.
These results are illustrated in Figure 3. An upward shift in the Ω(k)-locus causes the
economy to move along the i(k)-locus. Since the locus is upward sloping under an active
monetary policy, the economy moves from point A to point B. More formally, (16) implies
that dk/dg > 0 if and only if i0(k) > Ω0(k). Under an active monetary policy, i0(k) < 0.
B e c a u s ew ef o c u so nt h eu n i q u ee q u i l i b r i u m ,w eh a v e|i0(k)| > |Ω0(k)|. It follows that
i0(k) < Ω0(k). Therefore, we obtain dk/dg < 0 under an active monetary policy.
The intuition is as follows. An increase in government spending requires an increase in
either the direct tax revenue, the seigniorage, or the revenue from bonds. The monetary
policy rule (6) and the Fisher equation imply R = I∗(Π∗)−βΠβ−1,s oa ni n c r e a s ei ni n ﬂation
reduces capital accumulation if and only if monetary policy is active. Thus, under an active
monetary policy, an increase in the government’s need for revenue increases the inﬂation
rate, which increases both the nominal and the real interest rates. In other words, when the
7
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central bank is a tough inﬂation ﬁghter, an increase in government spending will result in
higher nominal and real interest rates, reducing capital and output.
Figure 3.
When monetary policy is passive, higher inﬂation reduces the real interest rate and
increases capital and output. In this case, an increase in government spending increases
both the inﬂation rate and the nominal interest rate. The overall eﬀect on the real interest
rate is negative, so the stock of capital and output increase. In Figure 3, the economy
moves from point A’ to point B’. More formally, (16) implies that dk/dg > 0 if and only if
i0(k) > Ω0(k). Under a passive monetary policy, i0(k) > 0. Because we focus on the unique
equilibrium, we have |i0(k)| > |Ω0(k)|. It follows that i0(k) > Ω0(k). Therefore, we obtain
dk/dg > 0 under a passive monetary policy.
Corollary 3 Under a passive monetary policy, the output eﬀect of ﬁscal policy is positive,
but it becomes negligible as β approaches unity.
To see this, consider (11), from which we can show that as β goes to unity, k approaches
(αA)1/(1−α). In other words, the i(k)-locus become a vertical line. Because the level of
capital is determined without any reference to g, there is no output eﬀect of ﬁscal policy.
Thus, an increase in g increases the nominal interest rate without any eﬀect on output. The
implication is important. For a positive output eﬀe c t ,t h eT a y l o rp r i n c i p l em u s tb ev i o l a t e d .
However, to prevent multiple equilibria, β must be close to unity, in which case the output
eﬀect become negligible.
8
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4. Conclusion
Because monetary policy is accommodative if and only if it is passive, a permanent
increase in debt-ﬁnanced government spending under an active monetary policy is contrac-
tionary. Thus, policy makers face a choice between implementing an activist ﬁscal policy and
following the Taylor principle. In addition, even under an accommodative monetary policy
rule, there is a trade-oﬀ between uniqueness of steady-state equilibrium and the strength of
the output eﬀect of ﬁscal spending.
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